21 ideas
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |